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We introduce a new method, based on immersive virtual reality (IVR), to give people the
illusion of having traveled backwards through time to relive a sequence of events in which
they can intervene and change history. The participant had played an important part in
events with a tragic outcome—deaths of strangers—by having to choose between saving
5 people or 1. We consider whether the ability to go back through time, and intervene,
to possibly avoid all deaths, has an impact on how the participant views such moral
dilemmas, and also whether this experience leads to a re-evaluation of past unfortunate
events in their own lives. We carried out an exploratory study where in the “Time Travel”
condition 16 participants relived these events three times, seeing incarnations of their
past selves carrying out the actions that they had previously carried out. In a “Repetition”
condition another 16 participants replayed the same situation three times, without any
notion of time travel. Our results suggest that those in the Time Travel condition did
achieve an illusion of “time travel” provided that they also experienced an illusion of
presence in the virtual environment, body ownership, and agency over the virtual body
that substituted their own. Time travel produced an increase in guilt feelings about the
events that had occurred, and an increase in support of utilitarian behavior as the solution
to the moral dilemma. Time travel also produced an increase in implicit morality as judged
by an implicit association test. The time travel illusion was associated with a reduction
of regret associated with bad decisions in their own lives. The results show that when
participants have a third action that they can take to solve the moral dilemma (that does
not immediately involve choosing between the 1 and the 5) then they tend to take this
option, even though it is useless in solving the dilemma, and actually results in the deaths
of a greater number.
Keywords: time travel, virtual reality, body ownership, trolley problem
INTRODUCTION
We introduce methodology based on immersive virtual reality
(IVR) that aims to provide an experience of travel backwards in
time to relive a past event, and potentially change history. We fur-
ther consider how such an experience might change attitudes and
views of the virtual time traveler, given an illusory experience of
going to the past and undoing actions that originally led to an
unfortunate outcome.
In one view of today’s physics time travel at the macro level
to the past is not feasible, and even if it were apparently achieved
it would be travel to a parallel universe (see extensive discussions
in Deutsch and Lockwood, 2009; Deutsch, 2011). Nevertheless,
the idea of time travel has long been one that has captured the
imagination—both travel to the future in the story of Urashima
Tarô (8C) and H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine, and travel to the
past (e.g., Lest Darkness Fall by L. Sprague de Camp). Time travel
is a recurring theme in cinema; a recent example that included
time travel is Looper1 , involving the curious practice of crimi-
nals in the future sending their enemies to the past in order to
be executed by paid assassins there.
Travel to the past raises scientific and philosophical issues that
future travel avoids: it includes the possibility of changing of his-
tory with the paradoxes that this can imply. For example, in the
Grandfather paradox, a person travels to the past and kills one
of their own ancestors ensuring that they would have never been
born to travel back to the past and accomplish this act. The movie
Looper illustrates one of the potential paradoxes involved in time
travel, where time travelers from the future can change history by
amending the past, so that their own existence vanishes—leaving
the viewer to wonder how any of the events of the movie could
have taken place at all. Moreover, there have been recent attempts
to discover whether time travelers are walking amongst us by
1http://www.sonypictures.com/movies/looper/
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examining whether the Internet contains any trace of their mes-
sages (Nemiroff and Wilson, 2013). Some of the paradoxes and
philosophical arguments around the concept of time travel to the
past are discussed, for example, in Grey (1999); Dowe (2000).
Irrespective of whether time travel to the past is in any way
possible, here we consider the question—what if it were possible?
What if someone could travel back through time and experience
a sequence of events, and be able to intervene in order to change
history? Specifically, we simulate a sequence of events that has
a tragic outcome (deaths of strangers) in which the participant
unavoidably plays an important role. In our setup the partic-
ipant is caught in a classic moral dilemma: if he or she does
nothing then five people would die for certain; if he or she acts
then five people might be saved but another would die. This is
derived from the moral dilemma known as the “trolley” or “box-
car” problem where an out of control trolley or boxcar on a
railway track would kill five people unless diverted, in which case
it would kill one. Such problems are usually addressed empirically
by questionnaires2, where respondents are required to indicate
whether they would do nothing allowing the five to die or divert
the trolley thus killing one. Typically 80–85% of people choose to
divert the trolley sacrificing one to save five (Hauser et al., 2007).
Such classic moral dilemmas as the trolley problem have been
studied in moral philosophy and more recently by neuroscientists
in the context of the processes involved in action in moral deci-
sion making—see Greene et al. (2001); Cushman et al. (2006).
Here we have simulated a moral dilemma similar to the trolley,
except that the agent of harm is a (virtual) human rather than a
run-away trolley, and where it is possible to find a solution to the
problem without the deaths of anyone. Our work is exploratory
considering whether the ability to go back through time and inter-
vene, to possibly avoid all deaths through finding the solution,
might have an impact on how the participant responds to such
moral dilemmas, and also have an impact on how past actions
with unfortunate outcomes in their own lives are seen.
We use IVR to give people the illusion of having traveled
back through time. IVR can create three specific types of illu-
sion that we exploited for this purpose: presence, body ownership
and agency. The first, “presence,” is the illusion of being in the
place depicted by the virtual environment (place illusion) and of
the reality of the events taking place there (plausibility) (Sanchez-
Vives and Slater, 2005; Slater, 2009). The second is the illusion of
“body ownership”: in IVR it is possible to endow participants with
an alternate life-sized virtual body that is spatially coincident with
their own real body. This substitute virtual body is seen through
a wide field-of-view stereo and head-tracked head-mounted dis-
play (HMD) from first person perspective when looking directly
down toward the own body and also when looking in a mirror.
This can give rise to the illusion that the substitute body is the
participant’s own body (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Slater et al.,
2010). Through real-time motion capture the virtual body moves
synchronously with the real body, thus giving the third illusion
(“agency”) (for example, as in Banakou et al., 2013) where the
participant has the sensation of being the cause of the movements
of the body. We aimed to create strong illusions of presence, body
2http://moral.wjh.harvard.edu
ownership, and agency, and using these to project a participant
back through virtual time to relive and be able to intervene in a
sequence of events over and over again.
If you are involved in a sequence of events and then step into
a machine that takes you back to the start of those events, there
are various possibilities regarding what you would perceive and
how you might be able to act. Of course you should see the events
that had occurred, which includes perceiving that earlier version
of yourself doing whatever you originally did, together with all
the consequences of those actions. However, immediately there is
a problem: can you intervene in and change those events or not? If
you have physical presence then you can cause events just as any
other agent in the situation. This physical presence also implies
that your former self should be fully aware of you. However, were
this to be the case then the first time that you had experienced
those events your future self should have been present, and you
should have a memory of that having occurred. Alternately you
may have no physical presence but just be an observer of those
past events. This type of situation is discussed in Deutsch (2011)
where this example is used to show that the possibility of phys-
ical intervention requires the existence of parallel universes (the
Multiverse). Here, since it is virtual reality, and we are not bound
by the laws of physics governing time travel, we can adopt an
intermediate position. You as the time traveler can effect changes
to the events, therefore changing history, but you are not visible
to your past self.
We use two different conditions in our exploratory study. In
both participants are embodied in a virtual body and experience
a sequence of events in which they are faced with the choice of
allowing five people to die or saving the 5 at the cost of 1. In
the Time Travel condition at the end of this sequence they are
transported back to the start of the events, but see and hear their
previous self-representation carrying out the actions that they
had carried out before. In this condition they can cause events,
but the previous incarnation of the self is not aware of the cur-
rent self. Subsequently once the sequence of events is played out
again, possibly changed from the first time around due to new
events caused by the participant, the participant is once again
transported back to the start, now seeing and hearing the two
previous self-incarnations. Thus, there are three trials. In the
Repetition condition the first trial is the same as the Time Travel
condition, but in the second trial the participant is simply faced
with exactly the same events again, as in a video game where a
“life” is lost and the game starts again. Here there is no notion
of “time travel”—the representations of the previous incarna-
tions are not shown, and the participant is free to act, in the
second and third trials of course utilizing the knowledge gained
from the previous trials. It should be noted that the first trials in
both conditions are therefore identical and provide an IVR expe-
rience representing a version of the classic trolley-type of moral
dilemma.
The goal of this exploratory study was to discover (i) whether
the Time Travel condition would be more likely to result in
the illusion of time travel than the Repetition Condition, (ii)
the extent to which the experience of illusory time travel might
influence attitudes toward morality, moral dilemmas and “bad
decisions” in personal history.
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The thinking behind our approach is that at some level the
brain does not distinguish between reality and virtual reality.
Therefore, there would be implicit learning that the past is muta-
ble. The illusion that the past can be changed might have impor-
tant consequences for present day attitudes and beliefs including
implications for psychotherapy.
METHODS
THE SCENARIO
The specific scenario we created was an art gallery on two levels
(ground and upper) (Figure 1). This is based on earlier work on
action in response to a moral dilemma (Pan and Slater, 2011).
In this situation the participant learns to operate a virtual eleva-
tor that takes (virtual human) visitors to the upper level or down
from upper level to the ground level at their request, and also
learns to operate an alarm that freezes the elevator in place and
makes an alarm sound. After six visitors have entered the gallery
there are five people browsing the paintings upstairs and one per-
son downstairs. A seventh person enters the gallery and asks to be
taken to the upper level. Upon arrival at the upper level, and while
still on the elevator platform, he immediately takes a gun out of
his pocket and starts shooting at the five people there. The partic-
ipant (elevator operator) then has a choice to make: either leave
the gunman to possibly kill all five people or send the elevator
down, where the one person might be killed instead. The partic-
ipant has also previously learned that pressing an alarm button
will immediately freeze the elevator in place (but this is no use
at this moment since the gunman is already shooting). After a
few seconds of this mayhem the scene dissolves and the partic-
ipant is back at the start of the whole sequence of events. Note
that one potential solution to the dilemma is to trap the gunman
on the elevator half way between the two floors by pressing the
FIGURE 1 | The gallery room scenario. (A) A participant wearing the
head-mounted display and the motion capture suit. (B) The gallery with
three visitors at the upper level, 1 on the ground level, and 2 waiting to
be taken up. The workbench is shown with the up and down elevator
control buttons and the red alarm button. The mirror reflects the virtual
body of the participant (here female), which can also be seen from
behind. The participants saw the environment from the first person
perspective of the body, and the virtual body was coincident in space with
their real body. (C) The gunman shoots at the five people on the upper
level. (D) The time travel (2nd time around)—where the participant is
embodied in the rightmost body by the workbench, and sees his previous
self-carrying out the actions from the 1st time around. (E) The time
travel 3rd time around, where the gunman is shooting. The participant is
in the leftmost body behind the workbench, and the two earlier clones
are to his right. (F) A close up of the embodiment illustrating visuomotor
synchrony. Here the participant sees through the eyes of the virtual body
and as she raises her arms the arms of the virtual body raise
synchronously, and this is also seen in the mirror reflection.
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alarm button. However, the first time that participants experience
this sequence of events this possibility is not useful, since they do
not know that the seventh person is a gunman until he is already
shooting. Therefore, if the goal were to save the five visitors on the
upper level then freezing the elevator in place would be exactly the
wrong thing to do since it would leave the gunman in the position
to shoot all of them.
In the Repetition condition exactly the same sequence of
events will then reoccur. In this condition the participant can
choose how to act now with knowledge about what is likely to
happen, and can of course change his or her actions compared to
the first “life.” In the Time Travel condition, however, each par-
ticipant sees and hears the earlier incarnation of him or herself
performing what they had actually done in the first round. We
refer to this virtual human character, that has the identical virtual
body as the participant, and that re-enacts the first round actions
of the participant as P1, and the actual human participant as P. P1
does the same actions as the participant had actually done and is
unaware of P. If P does not take any action (i.e., pressing buttons)
the sequence of events will unfold the same way as in the first
round, otherwise any action can result in a different sequence of
events and outcome.
Eventually in this second round there may be five people on
the upper level and one on the ground level (depending on the
actions of the participant) as before, and the gunman enters again.
The participant might infer that the same is likely to happen as in
the previous round and therefore try to take steps to stop this. In
particular, P might realize the solution, and try to trap the gun-
man between levels. In any event, whatever happens, once again
after the shooting takes place (or if the gunman is trapped) the
scene dissolves and the participant is back at the start. For those
in the Repetition group this is the start of the third identical trial.
However, those in the Time Travel condition now see their two
previous selves (P1 and P2) doing what they had done before.
Each participant finally experiences the three trials, and then the
virtual reality part of the experiment is terminated.
THE ABSTRACT REPRESENTATION OF TIME TRAVEL
Our approach to time travel is designed to provide participants
with the illusion of time travel. We will show how our approach
is different from typical simulations or video games, in which the
player can repeat a gamemultiple times. In this section we explain
our approach and illustrate it in relation to the gallery scenario
described above.
There are two levels of abstraction: the logic layer and the VR
layer. The logic layer is an abstraction handled by an automated
reasoning engine, which deals with the unfolding of the narra-
tive, and the VR layer has a much richer description of the virtual
world, which supports the immersive experience of virtual time
travel.
In the art gallery scenario the virtual environment includes the
following objects: visitors in the gallery, the participant, the eleva-
tor, a workbench with a mirror, up and down buttons to control
the elevator and an alarm button to freeze the elevator. The partic-
ipant is instructed to operate the elevator and follow the visitors’
requests as described earlier, and at the end of the scenario, after
the shooting, is transported back in time (or to replay the scenario
again in the Repetition condition). Here we concentrate on the
Time Travel condition since the repetition condition only involves
running the same program three times. We refer to the original
scenario as the 1st time around, and after the time travel to the
past, the 2nd time around, and then the 3rd time around. The
destination time was always fixed—time travel back to the begin-
ning of the scenario. However, the system does support time travel
to arbitrary times in the past.
Following time travel to the past the participant is embodied
in a new virtual body (looking identical to the first one). We will
refer to the virtual bodies representing the participant in the past
as clones. The participant sees and hears him- or herself from
behind and to the right side of the previous clone (Figure 1D,
Supplementary Movie S1). Everything takes place exactly as it did
in the 1st time around, until the participant takes actions that
modify the story line. Our system allows multiple time travels and
thus supports a large number of co-existing clones, and in this
case two past selves during the 3rd time around.
The crux of the time travel approach is the reasoning engine,
which is able to track and maintain causality. Causality raises
many scientific and philosophical questions. In this paper we
adopt the common sense notion of causality, which has also been
the subject matter of empirical studies (e.g., Michotte, 1963). In
our case the only way for the participant to “change the past” is by
controlling the elevator (directly by pushing its buttons or indi-
rectly by activating and deactivating the alarm). The reasoning
engine can deduce, for example, that if the gunman is not on the
upper floor then he cannot shoot the visitors in the upper floor,
and that if the visitors are not killed then they remain alive.
Our system tracks causality by maintaining an abstract rep-
resentation called history, which consists of a sequence of states
and a sequence of actions. At each moment the virtual world is in
some well-defined state, and objects perform actions that trans-
fer the world from one state to another. The reasoning engine
attempts to keep the history of the 2nd time around as close as
possible to the 1st time around, but it is also takes into account the
new actions introduced by the participant in the 2nd time around,
together with their causal effects.
All objects are defined by their state. For example, a visitor is
defined by its location and whether it is alive or dead, and the
elevator’s state describes whether it is in the ground floor, upper
floor, or traveling in between floors. An important challenge is
to include in the reasoning engine only those state variables and
actions that are necessary for the reasoning process. There are
many details that need to be modeled in the VR but for tractabil-
ity we can assume they do not affect the narrative, and thus are
not included in the reasoning engine. For example, in the abstract
specification it is not important exactly where the visitors are, so
in terms of the reasoning engine their location is abstracted to
being either outside the gallery, on the ground level, or on the
upper level. In the VR layer exact trajectories in space and time
are maintained.
We distinguish between three types of entities, in terms of
causality: (i) the participant, (ii) physical objects, and (iii) agents.
The latter category includes, in our case, both the visitors and
the previous clones of the participant. The human participant is
always assumed to have “free will”; the system cannot dictate his
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actions, and cannot override his previous actions. Second, there
are simulated objects; in our case, the elevator and the alarm.
We assume that physical objects follow well-defined determin-
istic rules, and therefore our engine applies standard simulation
techniques to these objects.
The main difference between our approach and other simu-
lations is the way we model human behavior; this is the third
class of entity—the agents. For these entities the algorithm tries
to “replay” their behavior as much as possible, i.e., simulated
humans will act during the 2nd time around exactly as they did
the 1st time around, unless this involves a logical contradiction.
This part of our method is again consistent with our common
sense view; even if we have approximate models of human behav-
ior, sometimes we regard people’s actions as idiosyncratic and
arbitrary. It is exactly this seemingly unpredictable behavior that
makes narratives compelling, and this is what we want the time
travel approach to maintain. In our case such time travel mod-
eling is restricted to humans, but in general there can be other
low probability events that we want to be repeated the 2nd time
around in the same way and at the same moment that they hap-
pened in the 1st time around. In our case we have opted to model
the previous clones of the participant as a type of agent, just like
the visitors.
Technically, all actions have preconditions and postconditions.
Preconditions define the states that specific objects should be in,
so that the action can be performed. Post-conditions define the
specific states that specific objects should be in after the action is
performed. A major element of the time travel approach is that
the 2nd time around the system tries to repeat the history exactly
as it took place the 1st time around, but if some preconditions
do not hold for specific actions then these actions do not take
place. In some cases the reasoning engine replaces these actions
by similar actions, and in other cases these actions are avoided
altogether.
During the 1st time around the system plays events according
to a predetermined script and records the participant’s actions.
The reasoning engine is only activated the 2nd time around, or, in
general, after the first occurrence of time travel to the past. From
that point onwards the simulation engine operates differently for
three types of actions: (i) new actions taken by the participant, (ii)
actions performed by simulated physical objects, and (iii) actions
that were taken by agents and need to be repeated following what
happened the 1st time around.
If the participant takes an action it is always executed—if the
participant was able to take this action in the VR then it can-
not have been logically invalid. The action is also recorded in
the history of the 2nd time around; this is necessary for further
time travels (in our case there is also 3rd time around). A sec-
ond category consists of those actions taken by simulated physical
objects. In our case this applies to the elevator and the alarm—
they are simulated in the 2nd time around regardless of the 1st
time around. If the participant does not intervene then the alarm
and the elevator would behave exactly as they did in the 1st time
around. Also, if we would have attempted to replay the elevator’s
actions in the same way that we model agents then any slight
divergence of the 2nd time around from the 1st time around
might result in incoherent behavior. This discrepancy in the way
we model physical objects and human agents is in accordance
with common sense and everyday psychology: as people we pay
much attention to human behavior and its timing, but we do
not pay as much attention to automated objects, as long as they
behave consistently.
The third category of actions consists of those that were taken
by agents the 1st time around and now need to be repeated.
Following time travel the virtual time is reset to the beginning
of the 1st time around. As time passes (both virtual and phys-
ical time), whenever the virtual time coincides with the virtual
start time of a recorded action, the reasoning engine checks the
preconditions of this action. If these are satisfied then the action
takes place, exactly as it did the 1st time around. However, if any
of the preconditions are violated, the action does not take place.
Instead, the reasoning engine tries to automatically replace it by a
similar action, as explained below. If no replacement is possible,
the action is ignored.
In our scenario there are only two types of actions that can
be replaced by other actions. The main automated replacement
is for the shooting action by the gunman. The 1st time around
the gunman shoots the five visitors in the upper floor, let us label
them V1, V2, V3, V4, and V5. The 2nd time around the gunman
tries to shoot the same number of visitors at the same (virtual)
time. If the 2nd time around the gunman is again at the upper
floor then the shooting takes place as it did in the 1st time around.
However, if the gunman is now on the ground floor the reasoning
engine tries to match new targets for the shooting actions. The
result is that the gunman shoots the single visitor that is on the
ground floor, and even the participant. Since there is only one
visitor in the ground floor, V6, the reasoning engine replaces V1
by V6 andV2 by the participant. The other visitors, V3–V5, cannot
be replaced, so these actions are omitted from the history.
A similar action correction takes place for the action “enter-
floor,” which takes place anytime that any of the visitors (or the
gunman) exits the elevator. If the engine reaches a time that the
visitor has to exit the elevator, that visitor is in the elevator, and
the elevator is stationary at one of the floors, then the visitor exits
the elevator, regardless of whether it is the same floor as the 1st
time around.
There are two “solutions” that the participant can reach in
order to prevent any shooting. The first solution is to let the
gunman enter the elevator but press the alarm button before the
elevator reaches the upper floor. The second solution is to avoid
sending the visitors upstairs, but to send the gunman upstairs.
Quite a few participants were able to arrive at the first solution
(see Results), but none realized the second solution.
An additional solution would be to keep the gunman on the
ground floor. However, in this case the gunman would always
shoot at least one visitor—the one that was preprogrammed to
remain in the ground floor—and possibly the participant.
We provide this narrative as a concrete example illustrating the
reasoning engine in action. Consider the following abstract script
fragment, which takes place after the gunman enters the gallery,
1st time around (G is the gunman, P is the participant, V1, . . .,V5
are the upper floor visitors):
G enters gallery
G enters elevator
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P pushes elevator up
Elevator starts moving up
Elevator arrives upper floor
G shoots V1, V2, V3, V4, V5
P pushes alarm
alarm on
P travels back in time
Second-time around the participant tries to avoid the shooting by
turning on the alarm, just after his previous clone (now P1) sent
the elevator up. The new action and state are shown in bold.
G enters gallery
G enters elevator
P1 pushes elevator up
P pushes alarm
alarm on
Elevator starts moving up
Elevator arrives upper floor
G shoots V6
P1 pushes alarm
alarm off
As a result the elevator is blocked and does not go to the upper
floor; this is marked in the two actions shown as crossed out: they
happened 1st time around but not 2nd time around. The reason-
ing engine then replaces the shooting of the visitors in the upper
floor by another action—shooting the visitor on the ground
floor—this replaced action is shown as underlined. Finally, note
that the alarm object is simulated, so now after the shooting it is
actually turned off by the clone P1 rather than being turned on as
the 1st time around (shown in italic). This is because the alarm is
a toggle (pressing it will change its state to the opposite state) and
so since the participant had turned it on, when the clone presses
the button again it will be turned off. Here actions are preserved
rather than outcomes.
In this explanation we have concentrated on the 1st time and
2nd times around but our system allows multiple time travels.
Whenever history has changed by time travel it now becomes
the relevant history for the next time travel. That is, whenever
we write 1st time around and 2nd time around these could be
replaced by (n-1)th time around and nth time around, respec-
tively. Or in other words: whenever history “changes” the original
history is discarded and the new history becomes the frame of
reference.
An important part of our method is that the reasoning engine
is integrated with the IVR system. Where the reasoning engine
decides, for example, “the gunman shoots at visitor 1” this has
to be transformed into actual animations of the virtual human
characters, who are in a particular place in a relatively complex
scenario, with a certain body size, a certain distance between
them, and so on. Describing how the VR layer is combined with
the reasoning engine is beyond the scope of this paper, and will be
discussed in later work.
THE EXPERIMENT
PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT
Thirty-eight participants were recruited for the experiment. Each
was assigned on arrival and alternately to one of the two groups
(Time Travel or Repetition) by order of their appearance at our
laboratory. Each participant was asked to attend the laboratory on
two occasions separated by approximately a week. The sample had
an equal number of males and females in each of the two groups.
However, the results of six participants were discarded (four due
to technical problems and two because they failed to attend the
second session of the experiment). Therefore, the final sample size
was 32, 16 in each group, with an even gender balance. There were
no differences between the groups with respect to mean age, prior
use of virtual reality, gaming experience, etc. (Supplementary
Material 1).
The study was approved by the Bioethics Committee of the
University of Barcelona. All participants were given basic infor-
mation about the experiment (the real purpose of the study was
not revealed prior to completion) and signed an informed con-
sent formwhen they agreed to take part of each phase of the study.
They were paid 5C for participating in the first session of the
experiment, and 5C more when they came back for the second
part.
EQUIPMENT
The virtual environment was implemented in Unity3D and deliv-
ered visually through a wide field-of-view stereo HMD the
NVIS nVisor SX1113 (Figure 1A). This has dual SXGA dis-
plays with 76◦H × 64◦V degrees field of view (FOV) per eye,
totaling a wide field-of-view of 102◦ horizontal and 64◦ ver-
tical, with a resolution of 1280 × 1024 per eye displayed at
60Hz. Head tracking was performed by a 6-DOF Intersense
IS-900 device. Participants wore Asus HS-1000W earphones4over
the HMD.
Tactile feedback was provided based on an Arduino board con-
nected to the computer via USB controlling two small vibrator
devices. The vibrator devices were placed in the palmar areas of
the middle fingers of each hand to give vibrotactile feedback when
the participant touched the buttons that control the elevator in
the virtual environment.
Participants in the art gallery were endowed with a gender-
matched human virtual body. This moved in real time with the
movements of the participant. In order to achieve this we used an
Xsens body tracking suit for motion capture and MVN Studio
software. Hence movements of the virtual body were mapped
in real-time from the motion capture of the participants’ real
movements.
Based on results from previous papers (Banakou et al.,
2013; Peck et al., 2013; Kokkinara and Slater, 2014) we
expected high scores on a questionnaire that assessed the illu-
sions of body ownership (the virtual body perceptually expe-
rienced as the own body) and agency (the sensation of caus-
ing the movements of the virtual body). In this experimen-
tal setup participants would have both visual-motor synchrony
(through the motion capture) and some visual-tactile syn-
chrony (through the vibrotactile stimulation on the palms of
the hands whenever they touched the buttons to control the
elevator).
3http://www.nvisinc.com/product/products.html?reqview=spec&fid=a0QG00
00009NGzCMAW&fname=nVisor%20SX111
4http://www.asus.com/Multimedia/HS1000W/
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PROCEDURES
On their first visit to the laboratory participants signed
an informed consent form, and completed a demographic
questionnaire (giving information about their age, work, and
so on) and two implicit association tests (see Section “Implicit
Association Test for Morality” and Supplementary Material 4).
They then entered the virtual environment using the head-
tracked HMD and earphones. They heard pre-recorded instruc-
tions through the earphones to look around and describe the
environment. They first saw a simple training environment, and
then the art gallery, with some virtual visitors arriving and going
to the upper level or staying on the ground floor looking at the
paintings. In this experience they were embodied in a virtual
body as described earlier, but did not wear the motion capture
equipment, so they were asked to sit in a specific posture, cor-
responding to that of their virtual body. After exiting the virtual
environment they were asked to secretly rate three past decisions
in their lives that they regretted and the information was placed
in a sealed envelope unseen by the experimenters. They were then
asked to read a short passage about the meaning of time travel.
The aim of this was to instill the idea that when past history is
changed it means that the original history actually never hap-
pened (Supplementary Material 5). Finally the participants were
paid for their attendance at the first session. There were two exper-
imenters present throughout. Procedures are illustrated in the
Supplementary Movie (this is in three parts only for reasons of
space).
Approximately 1 week later they returned to the laboratory,
and during this time they experienced the full scenario described
in Section “The Scenario,” according to the condition to which
they had been assigned. Prior to the start of the scenario they first
learned how to control the elevator to take visitors to the upper
floor, and to bring the elevator down again. They controlled the
elevator by pressing up and down buttons on a virtual workbench
in front of them. They also learned about the red alarm button on
the workbench, and that it would freeze the elevator and emit an
alarm sound. They learned that the button was a toggle that would
switch on the alarm, or switch it off if the alarm was on.
In this second week’s exposure they were standing with full
body tracking, saw their virtual body by looking at it directly from
first person perspective, and also in a mirror that was part of the
workbench. Since they were wearing themotion capture suit there
was visual-motor synchrony between theirmovements and that of
their virtual body.When they touched the up, down or alarm but-
tons they would see their virtual body move accordingly and feel
a corresponding vibrotactile sensation on the palm of the active
hand.
It is important to realize that in subsequent replays the par-
ticipants not only saw their previous incarnations carrying out
their former actions but also heard themselves speak as they spoke
before. For example, the 1st time around one of the visitors always
asked the participant for the time. Thus, the subsequent times
around the participants could hear their own voice replayed.
A particular trial in both the Time Travel and Repetition con-
ditions was terminated either 7 s after the last shooting and when
the gunman did not have a possibility of shooting again (i.e., the
elevator was not moving and there were no visitors alive on that
level), or when the gunman had been trapped inside the elevator
for 7 s. Then the operator would trigger the next trial, or at the
end of the third trial terminate the experiment.
At the end of their three experiences the participants took
off the HMD and they completed the same two IATs as in their
first visit. They then completed a questionnaire concerned with
the illusions of body ownership, agency, presence, the illusion of
time travel, and other aspects of their experience. They were then
asked to think about their three bad decision ratings that they had
made the previous week, asked to rate these decisions again, with
the sealed envelope available to them. The experimenter was able
to record the score from the previous week and the new score,
though at no time knew what the decisions were about. After this
the participants were interviewed and debriefed, removed all the
equipment, and were paid.
The full procedures are described in detail in Supplementary
Material 2.
RESPONSE VARIABLES
Body ownership, agency, and presence
Since this is an exploratory study intended to introduce how
IVR can be used to generate an illusion of time travel, here we
only report the variables that ultimately proved useful in our
exploratory statistical model of the results. Details of the variables
measured are given in Supplementary Material 3.
The perceptual illusion of ownership with respect to the vir-
tual body seen from first person perspective that substituted the
real body was assessed with four questions in the questionnaire
administered after the three scenario trials. Each question was in
the form of a statement that was rated on a 1–7 Likert scale where
1 represented “strongly disagree,” and 7 “strongly agree.” The
questions are shown in the Body ownership section of Table 1.
These questions were based on previously published work (e.g.,
Banakou et al., 2013).
In order to obtain one overall score a factor analysis was car-
ried out on the four variables (mirror, down, other,mybody) using
principle components factors (Stata 135). This resulted in one
factor with the best fit to the original data with the smallest
uniqueness values per variable, and explaining 76% of the total
variance. Table 2 shows the factor loadings and uniqueness val-
ues. From the factor analysis a combined score (Ownership) was
derived using the regression scoring method. The factor load-
ings in Table 2 are equivalent to the Pearson correlations between
Ownership and the original four variables.
Agency was assessed with the agency question. The main
point of this was to test the adequacy of the real-time motion
capture and display of the virtual body. Whereas due to indi-
vidual differences there could be variations amongst partici-
pants in relation to body ownership, we did not expect much
variation with respect to agency since it was a factual state-
ment that the body did (or did not) move according to the
movements of the participants. In fact 28 out of the 32 par-
ticipants rated the agency question with a score of 6 or 7,
and the remaining 4 with a rating of 5. We will therefore not
5http://www.stata.com
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Table 1 | Questions for body ownership, agency, presence, and guilt.
Concept Variable name Statement
Body ownership mirror Even though the virtual body I saw did not look like me, I had the sensation that the virtual body I saw
in the mirror was mine.
down Even though the virtual body I saw did not look like me, I had the sensation that the virtual body that I
saw when I looked down at myself, was mine.
other I felt that the virtual body that I saw was someone else.
mybody Overall even though the virtual body I saw did not look like me I had the sensation that the virtual body
I saw was my body.
Agency agency The virtual body moved according to my movements.
Presence placeillusion I had the sensation of being in the gallery
plausibility There were times when the gallery was more real for me than the laboratory in which everything was
really taking place.
copresence How much did you find yourself responding to the visitors as if they were real people?
Guilt and self-assessment guilt Do you feel any guilt about what happened to the visitors?
triedmybest I tried my best to save the visitors from the shooting.
All responses on a 1–7 scale with 1 meaning most disagreement with the statement, and 7 most agreement.
Table 2 | Factor analysis for body ownership questions.
Variable Factor loading Uniqueness
mirror 0.94 0.11
down 0.78 0.40
other −0.79 0.38
mybody 0.96 0.08
refer again to this variable, it is simply an indication of system
performance.
The illusion of presence (“place illusion” and “plausibility”)
was assessed with the questions shown in Table 1. Again these
were taken from previous papers—see Box 2 of Sanchez-Vives and
Slater (2005). The “copresence” question was included to assess
how participants assessed the virtual visitors. The copresence
scores are uncorrelated with both placeillusion and plausibility,
but Spearman’s rho = 0.39 (P = 0.03) between placeillusion and
plausibility.
Table 1 also includes questions about “guilt” and whether par-
ticipants felt that they “tried their best,” that proved useful in the
analysis. These were not taken from any existing source.
Implicit association test for morality
There were two IAT results from each of the two visits to the lab-
oratory. Both are described in detail in Supplementary Material
4. One was concerned with feelings of guilt based on Xu et al.
(2012). However, the Guilt IAT taken after the second visit VR
experience resulted in 5 missing values due to procedural or par-
ticipant errors and so could not be used. The second was based
on Perugini and Leone (2009) concerned with the moral behav-
ior of the participant. This IAT has been shown to correlate well
with actual moral behavior. There were no missing values in these
data. We refer to the two moral IAT scores as PreIAT and PostIAT
for the scores in the first and second week respectively (the second
of course taken after the VR experience).
Discomfort about 3 past decisions
The three bad decisions rated by the participants in both the first
week and after the end of their experience in the second week were
each rated on a 1–100 scale, representing their degree of regret
about those decisions (100 the greatest regret). We calculated the
mean of the three decision scores each week. The corresponding
variables are PreRegret for the mean score in the first week, and
PostRegret for the mean score at the end of the VR experience in
the second week.
Moral choice scenarios
At the end of the questionnaire the participants read five moral
dilemma scenarios—three were based on the boxcar problem
(equivalent to the trolley problem), and two were based on the
actual dilemma in the gallery (Supplementary Material 3). For
each one they were asked whether or not they would “push the
switch”—in each case resulting in the deaths of 5 people or 1. We
restrict attention to the boxcar problem of which there were three
variants each with a yes/no answer.
(a) Boxcar 5—the boxcar by default will kill 5, throwing the
switch will divert the boxcar to kill 1 instead. Question: would
you throw the switch?
(b) Boxcar 1—the boxcar by default will kill 1, throwing the
switch will divert the boxcar to kill 5 instead. Question:
Would you throw the switch?
(c) Boxcar footbridge—the boxcar by default will kill 5. If a
man with a heavy backpack is pushed onto the track from
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a footbridge where he and the observer are standing then the
5 will be saved but the man will be killed. Question: would
you push the man off the footbridge onto the track?
From these three we construct a new variable representing the
number of scenarios out of the three in which 1 will be saved
rather than the 5 [pushing the switch in (a), not pushing it in (b)
and not pushing the man in (c)]. We refer to this variable as save1,
which ranges from 0 to 3. Also we single out the footbridge ques-
tion since this has a different element involving actively killing 1
by pushing him to save 5. Hence we will also use footbridge, which
is a binary variable, in place of save1.
The illusion of time travel
This was assessed with the question: “The overall experience
was more like...” where the response was on a 1 to 7 scale, 1
meaning “Replaying a video game” and 7 meaning “Experiencing
time travel.” We refer to the corresponding ordinal variable as
timetravel.
Hypotheses and statistical methods
This exploratory study was motivated by the idea that a strong
sense of presence and body ownership in a virtual environment,
together with a scenario where participants witnessed their own
past actions carried out by a virtual human in which they had
previously been embodied, would lead to an illusion of having
traveled in time. A second level hypothesis was that the illusion of
traveling in timemight influence present day attitudes—in partic-
ular possibly lessening negative feelings associated with past deci-
sions, giving a different perspective on past actions—including
those associated with the experienced scenario.
This being a new area of study we collected a large amount of
data (Supplementary Material 3). We focus here only on the core
ideas.
For analysis we used statistical models appropriate to the
type of data. Condition is a binary factor (Repetition = 0, Time
Travel = 1), similarly with Gender (Male = 0, Female = 1). We
treat Ownership as a continuous latent variable representing the
subjective illusion of ownership of the virtual body, and positively
associated with mirror, down, mybody, and negatively associated
with other (Tables 1, 2).
PostIAT and PreIAT are treated as continuous variables,
where greater values are associated with more moral behav-
ior (Supplementary Material 4). PreRegret and PostRegret are
likewise treated as continuous variables with greater values indi-
cating greater discomfort about the three past decisions. Our
model fitting strategy allows the “Post” variables to be influ-
enced by the “Pre” variables, in other words the “Pre” variables
appear on the right hand sides of the equations defining the
model.
Save1 is a variable representing a count out of a maximum of
3. We treat this as a binomial random variable, where greater val-
ues indicate a greater propensity to save the 1 (non-utilitarian)
rather than the 5 (utilitarian). Footbridge is treated as a binary
(Bernoulli) random variable, 1 indicating a “yes” answer to
pushing the man to stop the boxcar (utilitarian), and 0 “no”
(non-utilitarian).
The remaining variables are all questionnaire responses mea-
sured on an ordinal scale from 1 to 7.
Stata 13 was used for all statistical analysis. Since we have a
multilevel hypothesis (condition, presence and body ownership
influence time travel, and time travel in turn influences various
other responses) we use path analysis to bring all relationships
of interest into one statistical model. Stata 13 has the facility for
path models that include factor variables and handles distribu-
tions other than normal (the function “gsem”). Path analysis was
used since it supports the simultaneous evaluation of multiple
stochastic equations—in other words it is not restricted to a sin-
gle response variable as in the case of the general linear model
(regression, ANOVA). Given the specification of any model (i.e.,
set of stochastic equations) the total covariance matrix is esti-
mated, typically through maximum likelihood estimation. Path
analysis was first described in the 1920’s (Wright, 1921) with an
up to date explanation in, for example, (Kaplan, 2009). We have
used this several times before to unravel complex relationships in
the context of body ownership studies (e.g., Kilteni et al., 2012;
Llobera et al., 2013; Pomes and Slater, 2013; Steptoe et al., 2013).
Given the nature of our study, path analysis has been used as an
exploratory rather than a confirmatory tool.
The path model specifies each variable according to its type
as discussed above. In particular the equations specifying con-
tinuous variables are assumed to be normal linear models, the
binary, and count variables are treated as binomial-logistic mod-
els, and the ordinal questionnaire data as ordered logistic models.
Throughout we have used robust standard errors of the coefficient
estimates since these allow departure from the strict distribu-
tional assumptions underlying the statistical inference models.
Moreover, we also relax the assumption of independence between
observations, allowing for the fact that there may be less variation
in responses within each gender group than between them—in
other words we use robust standard errors allowing for clustering
on gender.
RESULTS
PRESENCE AND BODY OWNERSHIP
Figure 2 shows box plots for the presence, body ownership and
agency questions (Table 1). It can be seen that the subjective levels
of presence were high (median of 6 and interquartile range 5–7 for
both placeillusion and plausibility) and slightly lower (median 5)
and greater variability (IQR 3 to 6) for copresence. The body own-
ership illusion scores were relatively high (median 5 for each of
the positive questions, and 2 for the control question other) well in
line with previous studies (e.g., Banakou et al., 2013). The agency
scores were high as discussed earlier.
Overall the goal of producing a system that could lead most
participants to a high level of presence, body ownership and
agency, was achieved, though of course with variation due to
individual differences. There were no overall differences on any
of these variables due to condition (Repetition, Time Travel) or
gender.
HOW PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED THE MORAL DILEMMA
As noted earlier in the first round all participants faced the moral
dilemma of doing nothing, in which case 5 would die, or sending
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FIGURE 2 | Box plots for the presence and body ownership and agency
illusion questions. The thick horizontal lines are the medians, and the
boxes the interquartile ranges. The whiskers extend to 1.5 the interquartile
range or the extreme values in both directions. Values outside of this are
shown as single point outliers.
the elevator down potentially to endanger 1. There were possible
solutions that would have avoided all deaths, but this could not
have been known to any of the participants the first time around
since they did not know at this stage that the seventh visitor was a
gunman until he started shooting.
The one difference with the classical moral dilemma (such
as the trolley or boxcar) was that there was a third, albeit use-
less, action that participants could take once the shooting started
the 1st time around—press the alarm. In fact 28 out of 30
subjects selected this as their first action, and 2 selected the
Down button (to save the 5) (data on 2 participants was not
available). For their second action 12/30 (40%) of participants
chose to press the Down button. For their third action 6/30
pressed the Down button. By the end of the sequence in only
1 case was the elevator down though, due to attempts by par-
ticipants to trap the gunman and thus moving the elevator up
and down, and the remaining times it was up (64%) or between
floors (32%).
The 1st round resulted in 24/30 (80%) of cases where 5 visitors
were shot. The mean and standard deviation of the number shot
is 4.8 ± 0.81.
During the second round participants carried out almost
double the number of actions in the Time Travel condition com-
pared to Repetition (Table 3), and the difference is significant
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, P = 0.012). This difference is due to
the Time Travel participants having to cope with the 1st round
actions taken by their earlier self. In this condition the num-
bers shot were almost the same between the two conditions
(Table 4).
The third time around the number of actions in the Time
Travel condition reduced to be not much more than the
Repetition. This is because participants who had found a solu-
tion the second time round could just let this play out again. The
numbers shot also decreased again (Table 4).
We consider these results in the Discussion.
Table 3 | Mean and standard errors of numbers of actions by
condition.
Condition 2nd time around 3rd time around
Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Repetition 2.1 0.51 2.1 0.52
Time travel 4.5 0.74 3.5 0.58
Table 4 | Mean and standard errors of numbers shot by condition.
Condition 2nd time around 3rd time around
Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Repetition 2.3 0.48 1.2 0.43
Time travel 2.2 0.58 1.5 0.49
PATH ANALYSIS
Figure 3 shows the path diagram with statistics in Table 5.
The path diagram was derived from the hypotheses (Sections
“Hypotheses” and “Statistical Methods”). Paths that were not sig-
nificant (for example, placeillusion to timetravel) have not been
included. Where there is a significant interaction term (e.g., con-
dition∗timetravel) then following convention the main effects
are included even if not significant. Table 5 gives the complete
details about the path analysis. We consider each of the response
variables in turn.
The variation in responses to the timetravel question is not
explained by Condition alone. However, the path analysis shows
that overall it is influenced by plausibility, copresence and the
interaction betweenOwnership and Condition. The variable time-
travel is positively associated with plausibility, copresence and in
the Time Travel condition is positively associated withOwnership.
However, there is no association withOwnership in the Repetition
condition.
Timetravel is an endogenous variable in this model, and there-
fore can be entirely predicted within the model. The correlation
between the fitted values of the linear predictor for timetravel and
the observed values shows a good fit of the model to the data:
Spearman’s rho = 0.53 (P = 0.002).
Taking into account PreRegret, the PostRegret variable is pos-
itively influenced by the Time Travel condition, but the greater
the plausibility the lower the value of PostRegret only in the Time
Travel condition. In other words the greater illusion of real-
ity the lower the rating of regret, provided that this was in the
Time Travel Condition. The Spearman correlation of the fitted
values of the linear predictor and the observed values is 0.60,
P = 0.0003.
Taking into account the PreIAT score the PostIAT is negatively
associated with the timetravel illusion in the Repetition condi-
tion, and positively in the Time Travel condition (i.e., there is a
significant interaction effect between Condition and timetravel).
In other words in the Time Travel condition greater levels of the
illusion lead to an increase in implicit categorization of the self
as moral. (Spearman’s rho = 0.52, P = 0.002, for the correlation
between fitted and observed values, as above).
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FIGURE 3 | Path analysis corresponding to Table 5. The directional
edges represent hypothesized directions of causality. The numbers on
the edges are the coefficients of the linear predictor of the
corresponding model fit. The variables in plain boxes are treated as linear
normal models, and the specific model is otherwise shown in the
remaining boxes.
The feeling of guilt is positively associated with the time travel
illusion, but only in the Time Travel condition (Figures 3, 4).
Guilt is an endogenous variable that can be predicted entirely
within the model. The fitted values of the linear predictor for guilt
are well correlated with the observed values (Spearman’s rho =
0.62, P = 0.002).
The results for triedmybest suggested that overall participants
did try to save the visitors: this has a median score of 5 (IQR= 2).
Moreover it is related to guilt. Figure 5 suggests that in the Time
Travel condition the more that participants felt that they had tried
their best the lower their guilt. An ordered logistic regression of
guilt on Condition, timetravel and triedmybest allowing for inter-
actions between these two variables and Condition supports this
(Table 6). This shows that in the Repetition condition triedmybest
is positively associated with guilt, but through the interaction
between Condition and triedmybest, in the Time Travel condition
the association is negative (coefficient = −1.1, P < 0.0005). Also
in the Time Travel condition timetravel is positively associated
with guilt (coefficient = 1.0, P < 0.0005). We show the coeffi-
cients since they are almost the same magnitude but opposite in
sign. This means for example, that when in the Time Travel condi-
tion, participants have a strong subjective illusion of time travel,
and a strong belief that they had tried their best then these two
effects cancel out.
The variable save1 represents the propensity to save the 1
instead of the 5. This was negatively associated with timetravel.
This variable is also endogenous and can be predicted from the
model. The fitted values from the model correlate well with the
observed values (Spearman’s rho = 0.41, P = 0.02). Overall the
stronger the illusion the more the tendency toward a utilitarian
solution but also the greater the guilt.
DISCUSSION
The fundamental contribution of this paper has been to introduce
a new method for the induction and exploration of the conse-
quences of a time travel illusion using IVR. The application of the
method has tackled a number of broad questions and the results
point to some possible answers. However, our attempt to mea-
sure the “time travel” illusion was limited to a single question in
the questionnaire, the reason being that since this is a new illusion
it was not obvious which other questions to ask. A task of future
work will be to improve the subjective measure, partially based on
analysis of the interviews of participants after their experiences.
However, notwithstanding this limitation the findings suggest a
set of hypotheses for future work, each of which would ideally
require a specific focused experimental study.
First, we have considered whether it is possible to induce such
an illusion, and if so some of the consequences. Although the
manipulation (Repetition or Time Travel) did not by itself influ-
ence the subjective illusion of time travel, it did so in conjunction
with the illusion of body ownership, and plausibility, including
the extent to which the virtual visitors were experienced as if
they were real. Since this is an exploratory study we summarize
this finding as a hypothesis: If in IVR with embodiment in a vir-
tual body participants experience a sequence of events, and then
are involved in those same events over again where they can also
witness their past actions in the same virtual body that they previ-
ously had embodied, then they will experience this as time travel
provided that they also have a strong sense of body ownership
over that virtual body. Place illusion and plausibility will add to
that illusion. This is premised on a strong sense of agency over
the virtual body. Hence a future experiment would be designed
to maximize the probability of high subjective body ownership,
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Table 5 | Path analysis corresponding to Figure 3, n = 32.
Estimate of Standard P 95% Confidence
coefficient error interval
save1
timetravel −0.151 0.065 0.021 −0.279 −0.023
Constant −0.031 0.319 0.923 −0.656 0.594
guilt
timetravel 0.131 0.284 0.644 −0.425 0.688
Condition −4.302 1.777 0.015 −7.784 −0.820
Condition*timetravel 0.849 0.070 0.000 0.712 0.985
postIAT
timetravel −0.058 0.000 0.000 −0.059 −0.058
Condition −0.344 0.250 0.169 −0.835 0.146
Condition*timetravel 0.130 0.018 0.000 0.095 0.165
preIAT 0.241 0.115 0.036 0.015 0.468
Constant 0.548 0.014 0.000 0.521 0.575
timetravel
Condition*Ownership 0.804 0.259 0.002 0.297 1.311
Ownership −0.060 0.050 0.230 −0.159 0.038
plausibility 0.548 0.071 0.000 0.408 0.687
Condition 0.503 0.754 0.504 −0.974 1.981
copresence 0.198 0.053 0.000 0.093 0.303
PostRegret
plausibility 0.892 0.524 0.089 −0.136 1.920
Condition 16.832 3.486 0.000 9.999 23.665
PreRegret 0.764 0.119 0.000 0.530 0.997
Condition*plausibility −2.901 1.226 0.018 −5.303 −0.499
Constant 6.679 12.222 0.585 −17.276 30.634
In the first column the dependent variables are shown in bold. Condition has
Repetition = 0, Time Travel = 1. Constant refers to the intercept term of the
linear predictor of each model equation. *Refers to an interaction term. Standard
Errors are robust and allow for non-independence (clustered on gender). P =
0.000 means P < 0.0005.
Table 6 | Ordered logistic regression for guilt, n = 32.
Estimate of Standard P 95% Confidence
coefficient error interval
guilt
Condition 0.038 1.122 0.973 −2.162 2.238
timetravel 0.034 0.291 0.907 −0.536 0.604
triedmybest 0.542 0.027 0.000 0.490 0.595
Condition*timetravel 1.013 0.003 0.000 1.007 1.020
Condition*triedmybest −1.065 0.045 0.000 −1.154 −0.976
Condition has Repetition = 0, Time Travel = 1. Constant refers to the intercept
term of the linear predictor. *Refers to an interaction term. Standard Errors are
robust and allow for non-independence (clustered on gender). P = 0.000 means
P < 0.0005.
using multiple multisensory techniques—exploiting first person
perspective, visuomotor synchrony, and visuotactile synchrony,
discussed in Kokkinara and Slater (2014). Moreover there would
also need to be an explicit “non-embodiment” condition as a
control group with an attempt to minimize body ownership.
Our second hypothesis, and suggested future experimental
study, is that the experience of such time travel may lead to par-
ticipants implicitly accepting the notion that the past is mutable.
This may lead to a re-evaluation of some of their own past actions
that had unfortunate consequences and lessen the negative affect
associated with these.
The moral IAT test had as moral categories: honesty, humil-
ity, altruism, modesty, sincerity, ethical; and for the immoral
ones: deceptive, arrogant, cheater, egoism, vanity, corrupt. Our
third hypothesis and suggested study is that the experience of the
Time Travel condition together with a strong subjective sense of
time travel would lead to a greater propensity to implicit self-
classification as moral, with the meaning of this given by these
categories. This result is compatible with Segovia et al. (2009)
who carried out an experiment where people watched their self-
representation avatars carry out immoral or moral actions. The
results suggested that they became more immoral if they had seen
their avatar carry out immoral actions compared to if they had
seen their avatar carry out moral actions. From the results on
triedmybest and its relationship to guilt, it is likely that most of
the participants felt that they were behaving morally therefore
resulting in this exploratory finding.
The fourth hypothesis and suggested study is that guilt feelings
with respect to harm caused to others may be positively associated
with the illusion of time travel in the Time Travel condition. We
speculate that this may be because there is a greater likelihood of
association of the time travel with actual history. We have seen
that plausibility is positively associated with the illusion of time
travel, but the causality may go both ways. If participants observe
their own actions being replayed in the scenario, then since they
remember having carried out those actions for sure, this may add
to the illusion that these events actually happened. Therefore, the
illusion that harm was done to people would be strengthened,
and since that harm, whatever happened, was partly the respon-
sibility of the actions (or non-actions) of the participant, there
is greater room for guilt feelings. An experimental study would
be required to test these ideas, and also to untangle the direction
of causality.
The fifth hypothesis and study is that the illusion of time travel
is associated with tending to agree with a utilitarian solution of
the classic moral dilemmas. To explore this further, based on the
current data, instead of using the variable save1, we replace that
by the binary variable footbridge—which would be an extreme
version of utilitarianism not normally chosen by the majority of
respondents—i.e., deliberately and directly causing the death of 1
by pushing him into the path of the boxcar in order to save the
5. When this variable is used instead of save1 then again there is
a positive association with the time travel response (coefficient =
0.36, P = 0.001). Why people should become more utilitarian is
not clear. It could be because the illusion of time travel leads to
thoughts about future consequences in the sense that the deaths
of five people may have a far greater impact on the future than the
death of 1 (even though there may not be any absolute calculus
that says that the death of x people is preferable to the death of y
if x< y).
One very interesting finding is the behavior in the 1st time
around. Recall that almost all the participants pressed the alarm
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FIGURE 4 | Scatter diagram of guilt by timetravel for each of the two Conditions (Repetition and Time Travel).
FIGURE 5 | Scatter diagram of guilt by triedmybest for each of the two Conditions (Repetition and Time Travel).
button and that almost all the visitors were killed. This is in
contrast to questionnaire studies, and also the two virtual real-
ity studies that have reproduced moral dilemmas in IVR (Pan and
Slater, 2011; Navarrete et al., 2012). In both, participants over-
whelmingly saved the 5 (89 and 90% respectively in the relevant
condition). It seems that giving participants any alternative action
that seems to be related to solving the crisis, even though the
action is useless (here pressing the alarm), is not helpful at all. In
the classical and previous VR experiments typically one bystander
would die out of the six, whereas here we have found it to be
nearly all of them.
It is important to note that there were many other variables
that were not statistically related to either the experimental con-
ditions or to the illusion of time travel. For example, other than
the differences in the number of actions, explainable by the situ-
ation of the different conditions, there seems to be no difference
in actual behavior between the two conditions. It is also possible
that the two IAT tests may have influenced one another. There
were several variables with missing data that were not used in the
current analysis, so we emphasize that our experiment was only
exploratory, and its findings should be regarded as hypotheses for
future work.
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There is growing interest in the concept of “mental time
travel,” that is the ability to project oneself to the past to relive past
events in imagination (episodic memory), and to project also the
future. There is evidence that episodic memory and the capacity
to simulate future events share the same neural substrates, sug-
gesting a common neurocognitive system (Botzung et al., 2008)
and similar conclusions were drawn from a comprehensive lin-
guistic analysis (Stocker, 2012). This has led to suggestions that
episodic memory should be considered a part of a more general
faculty of mental time travel, which includes key capabilities such
as planning (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), or even sugges-
tions for re-conceptualizingmemory (Schacter et al., 2007). There
is also a debate on whether this capability is unique to humans
(Suddendorf and Busby, 2003; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007).
However, if mental time travel is beneficial, in particular in
the domain of self-improvement, then we suggest that our vir-
tual time travel could also be beneficial, even though many of the
research questions considered in the field of mental time travel are
unrelated to our virtual time travel. At least since psychoanalysis,
uncovering and to some extent reliving in imagination episodes
from our personal history, have been thought to be beneficial.
This has found its way into modern cognitive behavioral ther-
apy, for example, in a method for the treatment of post-traumatic
stress disorder (Ehlers et al., 2005). In this case an aspect of the
treatment is to identify salient moments in the memory of the
traumatic event, and then inventing an “alternative appraisal that
the patient finds compelling” and actively incorporating the new
appraisal into the traumamemory. This incorporation can be ver-
bal, through imagery, through writing, or though acting out the
memory.
Giving people the experience of time travel, and thereby an
implicit learning that the past is mutable may be useful in releas-
ing the grip of such past traumatic memories. Moreover, our
approach opens the door to laboratory controlled experimental
studies of the consequences of virtual time travel in this and other
related domains.
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